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SYMPOSIUM REVIEW
THE CONTINUING DEBACLE OF U.S.
ANTIDILUTION LAW: EVIDENCE FROM THE
FIRST YEAR OF TRADEMARK DILUTION
REVISION ACT CASE LAW
Barton Beebet
Abstract
This article evaluates the results of a quantitative study of all
reportedfederal court opinions that analyzed an issue in antidilution
law during a one year periodafterpassage of the TrademarkDilution
Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA). The article shows the remarkable
extent to which courts continue to treat the dilution cause of action as
superfluous to the infringement cause of action. As a result,
antidilution law continues to have no appreciable effect on the
outcomes of federal trademark cases or the remedies issuing from
those outcomes

t Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University.
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INTRODUCTION

At this writing, one year has passed since the October 6, 2006
adoption and effective date of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act
of 2006 (TDRA).' This brief article reports the results of a
quantitative study of all reported federal court opinions that analyzed
an issue in antidilution law during this one-year period. While it is
still early days for the TDRA, the case law reported in the year
following its adoption nevertheless presents strong and disturbing
evidence of the continuing debacle of U.S. antidilution law and of the
failure of the TDRA so far to effect any substantial change in course.
Most significantly, the case law shows the remarkable extent to which
courts continue to treat the dilution cause of action as redundant ofand, thus, made superfluous by-the infringement cause of action.
For all of the legislative and academic attention paid to it, antidilution
law continues to have no appreciable effect on the outcomes of
federal trademark cases or the remedies issuing from those outcomes.
Part II provides an overview of the eighty-five opinions studied
and shows the degree to which the now-defunct Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA)2 and the doctrinal regime built around it
continue to exert influence over our antidilution law. Part III details
the degree to which, in practice, the outcome of the dilution cause of
action is redundant of the outcome of the infringement cause of
action. Consider, for example, that of the twenty-six opinions that
found no infringement, none found dilution. Of the fifteen opinions
that found infringement, fourteen also found dilution, yet none of
these fourteen findings of dilution resulted in remedies not already
1. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 2007)). This brief report of
empirical findings is written for trademark specialists and assumes the reader's familiarity with
the legislative history and contents of both the TDRA and the previous act whose reforms it
abrogated, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995. See Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985,
985 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)). For an overview of the TDRA, see Barton Beebe,
A Defense of the New Federal TrademarkAntidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 1143 (2006). See also Robert G. Bone, A Skeptical View of the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act, 11 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 187 (2007); Jesse A. Hofrichter, Tool of the

Trademark: Brand Criticism and Free Speech Problems With the Trademark Dilution Revision
Act of 2006, 28 CARDOzO L. REV. 1923 (2006); David J. Franklyn, The New Federal AntiDilution Act: Reinstating the Myth of "Likely" Dilutive Harm as a Mask for Anti-Free-Rider
Liability, II INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 199 (2007). See generally 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:101 (4th ed. 2007).

2. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985, 985 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127
(2000)). On the FTDA, see generally DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL,
STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002).
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triggered by the court's finding of infringement. Part IV shows that
courts have largely failed so far to embrace certain important reforms
contained in the TDRA, such as its revised definitions of dilution by
"blurring" 3 and "tarnishment ' 4 and its heightened standard for
trademark fame. 5 Part V concludes by considering what can be done
to accomplish the still-unrealized goals of the TDRA.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE TDRA CASE LAW TO DATE
Of all federal court opinions reported in either the Westlaw or
Lexis databases and filed from October 6, 2006 through October 6,
2007, eighty-five opinions analyzed an issue in antidilution law. 6 In
this Part, I briefly report the venue, posture, and outcomes of these
opinions. I then show the extent to which, at least in this early set of
TDRA-era opinions, the dead hand of the FTDA still guides federal
antidilution case law.
A.

Venue, Posture,and Outcome

As Table 1 shows, seventy-six of the eighty-five opinions
studied were district court opinions and nine were circuit court
opinions. None of the circuit court opinions reviewed previous district
court opinions in the data set and none included concurrences or

3.

See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2007).

4.

Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C).

5.

Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A).

6.

To establish this study's core data set of eighty-five opinions, I searched the Lexis

Federal Court Cases, Combined database on October 13, 2007 using the following search string:
"trademark and dilution and date geq(10/01/2006)." This yielded 288 opinions, of which 27

were appellate opinions and 261 were district court opinions. Three of the district court opinions
were filed after October 6, 2007 and were excluded from consideration. I then searched the
Westlaw ALLFEDS database on the same day using an equivalent search string: "trademark and

dilution and da(afl 10/01/2006)." This also yielded 288 opinions, of which 26 were appellate
opinions and 262 were district court opinions. All of these opinions were filed from October 6,
2006 up to and including October 6, 2007.
I then compared the Lexis and Westlaw lists of opinions. Lexis yielded 17 opinions

that did not appear in Westlaw's results, while Westlaw yielded 20 opinions that did not appear
in Lexis's results. I thus reviewed a total of 308 unique opinions.
I then reviewed each of these 308 opinions and included in this study's core data set
any opinion that analyzed, however cursorily, an issue in federal or state antidilution law.
Opinions that merely referenced the federal or state antidilution statutes or causes of action

under them, but did not analyze an issue in antidilution law, were not included in the data set.
To determine whether the October, 2007 searches missed any relevant opinions that
addressed dilution but did not use the precise term "dilution," 1 searched the Lexis Federal Court
Cases, Combined database on January 15, 2008 using the following search string: "trademark
and dilut! and date geq(l0/01/2006) and not dilution." This search yielded no additional relevant

opinions.
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dissents. Given the results of past empirical analyses of federal
trademark case law, 7 it should not be surprising that the Second
Circuit produced the most circuit court opinions among the circuits,
with three, and that the Southern District of New York produced the
most district court opinions among the districts, with seven. At the
district court level, other usual suspects, such as the Northern and
Central Districts of California and the Northern District of Illinois,
also made substantial contributions to the district court case law.8

7. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1594-95 (2006) (discussing the prevalence of Southern
District of New York opinions in U.S. federal trademark infringement case law).
8. There is no common factor in the five opinions from the District of Arizona to
explain why it contributed such a surprisingly large number of opinions to the data set. See
Designer Skin, LLC v. S&L Vitamins, Inc., No. CV 05-3699-PHX-JAT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19506 (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2007); Century 21 Real Estate, LLC v. Century Ins. Group, No. CIV
03-0053-PHX-SMM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9720 (D. Ariz. Feb. 8, 2007); Century 21 Real
Estate LLC v. Century Sur. Co., No. CIV 03-0053-PHX-SMM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8434 (D.
Ariz. Feb. 5, 2007); Crown Realty & Dev., Inc. v. Sandblom, No. CV 06-1442-PHX-JAT, 2007
WL 177842 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2007); Best W. Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77942 (D. Ariz. Oct. 24, 2006).
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TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OF CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT OPINIONS
Circuit Court

Opinions
Circuit

District Court Opinions

N

%
I I.1

I

2

3

33.3

14

3

1

i1.1

5

6.6

4

2

5

6
7

9.2

E.D.
W.D.
N.D.
W.D.
M.D.

7

7

8

II

6

I 11.1

N

%

District

N

%

1.3

D. Mass.

1

1.3

18.4

N.D.N.Y.
E.D.N.Y.
S.D.N.Y.
D. Conn.

1
5
7
1

1.3
6.6
9.2
1.3

D.N.J.
E.D. Pa.

2
3

2.6
3.9

2.6

E.D. Va.

2

2.6

7.9

N.D. Tex.
S.D. Tex.

5
1

6.6
1.3

Mich.
Mich.
Ohio
Tenn.
Tenn.

3
I
1
1
1

3.9
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3

9.2

N.D. Ill.
C.D. Ill.
W.D. Wisc.

5
1
1

6.6
1.3
1.3

2

2.6

D. Minn.
W.D. Ark.

1
1

1.3
1.3

9

2

22.2

24

31.6

N.D. Cal.
C.D. Cal.
S.D. Cal.
E.D. Cal.
D. Nev.
D. Ariz.
D. Ore.
W.D. Wash.

5
3
4
2
I
5
2
2

6.6
3.9
5.3
2.6
1.3
6.6
2.6
2.6

10

1

11.1

3

3.9

D. Kansas
D. Utah

1
2

1.3
2.6

5

6.6

M.D. Fla.
N.D. Ga.

3
2

3.9
2.6

11
Total

9

76

76
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Table 2 reports the distribution of the eighty-five opinions
studied by posture and outcome. 9 Again, consistent with previous
studies of intellectual property case law in trademark' and
copyright," a large proportion (71%) of opinions addressing
uncrossed motions for summary judgment granted those motions.
Also consistent with previous work showing the extent of judicial
hostility towards antidilution law,' 2 a relatively small proportion
(18%) of opinions addressing preliminary injunction motions found
trademark dilution.

TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF OPINIONS BY POSTURE AND OUTCOME OF DILUTION ANALYSIS

Outcome
Dilution
Found

Dilution
Not Found

Fact Issue

Other

Total

Motionto
Dismiss

--

8

8

0

16

Preliminary
Injunction

2

9

0

0

11

SJ-Plaintiff

7

--

1

2

10

SJ-Defendant

--

15

6

0

21

SJ-Cross

1

6

4

0

11

Bench Trial

2

2

0

1

5

Other

4

1

0

6

11

Total

16

41

19

9

85

Posture

9.
was used.
10.
11.
2005, 156
12.

For the nine appellate opinions, the posture of the lower court opinion under review
See Beebe, supra note 7, at 1595-98.
See Barton Beebe, An EmpiricalStudy of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract-99842 1.
See Clarissa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (2006).
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B. The DeadHand of the FTDA
As several of the opinions studied explicitly recognized, 3 the
TDRA's damages provisions apply only to diluting conduct that
began after the effective date of the Act, but the TDRA's injunctive
relief provisions apply to all continuing diluting conduct regardless of
when the conduct first began or when the plaintiff filed its cause of
action. Disturbingly, however, many courts failed to apply the TDRA
to such conduct or otherwise unknowingly applied some combination
of the TDRA and FTDA or of the TDRA and circuit doctrine based
on the FTDA.
Table 3 reports which antidilution statute courts applied to the
dilution issue before them in the eighty-five opinions studied. While
thirty-three opinions (39%) explicitly applied only the TDRA,
twenty-one (25%) explicitly applied only the FTDA. Of these twentyone opinions, five acknowledged that the FTDA had been abrogated
but applied the provisions of the FTDA on the grounds that the
plaintiff filed its action before the effective date of the TDRA, 14 that
the plaintiff sought only monetary damages in connection with its
dilution claim,' 5 that the "parties agree[d]" that the FTDA should
apply,' 6 or that because the parties had not addressed the implications
of the new Act in their briefs on appeal, the court would not do so
either. 17 At least three of these opinions clearly addressed claims for
prospective relief.' 8 As for the remaining sixteen opinions that applied
only the FTDA, none expressed awareness of the TDRA and most

13.
See, e.g., Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 477 F.3d 765, 766 (2d
Cir. 2007); Autozone, Inc. v. Strick, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1044 (N.D. 111.2006); Dan-Foam
A/S. v. Brand Named Beds, LLC, 500 F. Supp. 2d 296, 306 n.87 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Qwest

Commc'ns Int'l v. Sonny Corp., No. C06-0020P, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87007, at *6 n.l (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 30, 2006); Best Vacuum, Inc. v. Ian Design, Inc., No. 04 C 2249, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 87260, at *17 n.5 (N.D. I11.Nov. 21, 2006).
14.
Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., No. 05-55627, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18339, at *10II n.2 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2007) ("Because this action was filed in 2004, prior to the 2006
amendment of§ 1125,... the previous version of§ 1125 applies.").
15.
S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. Austl. Gold, Inc., 05-CV-1217(JS)(MLO), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 74712, at *18 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2007) ("Because AG's claims arose prior to

October 2006 and AG seeks only monetary damages in connection with its dilution claim, the
FTDA and not the TDRA applies.").
16. See Hodgdon Powder Co. v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1232
n.3 (D. Kansas 2007); Top Tobacco, L.P. v. N. Atl. Operating Co., No. 06 C 950, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2838, at *22 n.3 (N.D. Il1. Jan. 4, 2007).
17.

Gen. Motors Corp. v. Urban Gorilla, LLC, 500 F.3d 1222, 1229 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007).
18.
See Gen. Motors, 500 F.3d at 1224-26; Hodgdon Powder, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1221;
Top Tobacco, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2838, at *1-5.
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opinions clearly addressed claims for prospective relief.19 Certainly,
courts' failure to apply the TDRA to dilution claims calling for
prospective relief is understandable even in opinions filed as late as
December of 2006,20 but one might expect that by May 21 or June 22 of
2007, courts would have become aware of the new act.
TABLE 3
ANTIDILUTION LAW APPLIED

Antidilution Law Applied

N

%

TDRA

33

38.8

FTDA

21

24.7

TDRA & FTDA

5

5.9

Unclear

14

16.5

State Law

12

14.1

Total

85

As Table 3 indicates, five opinions applied both the old FTDA
and the new TDRA. Three of them took a cautious, belt-andsuspenders approach to the issue of which act should apply.2 3 The
other two applied both acts apparently unknowingly. For example, in
Harris Research, Inc. v. Lydon, filed in April 2007, the court quoted
from the TDRA's new versions of Sections 43(c)(1) (setting forth the
modes of dilution that will trigger a finding of dilution) and
43(c)(2)(B) (setting forth factors for determining blurring),24 but also
quoted from the FTDA's now-abrogated Section 45 definition of
dilution. In Vista India v. Raaga, filed in August, 2007, the court

19. See, e.g., Nacco Materials Handling Group, Inc. v. Lilly Co., No. 05-2165 B, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41294 (W.D. Tenn. June 5, 2007); SG Servs. v. God's Girls Inc., CV 06-989
AHM (CTx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61970 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2007); Bay State Say. Bank v.
Baystate Fin. Servs., L.L.C., 484 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D. Mass. 2007); Ark. Trophy Hunters Ass'n
v. Tex. Trophy Hunters Ass'n, 506 F. Supp. 2d 277 (W.D. Ark. 2007).
20. See, e.g., Fuel Clothing Co. v. Safari Shirt Co., No. CV05-1220-HU, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 92052 (D. Ore. Dec. 18, 2006).
21. See SG Servs., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61970.
22. See Nacco MaterialsHandling, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41294.
23. See Verilux, Inc. v. Hahn, Case No: 3:05cv254 (PCD), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58507,
at *32-36 (D. Conn. Aug. 10, 2007); Qwest Commc'ns. Int'l v. Sonny Corp., No. C06-0020P,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87007, at *4-6 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2006); Best Vacuum, Inc. v. Ian
Design, Inc., No. 04 C 2249, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87260, at *17 (N.D. I11.Nov. 21, 2006).
24. Harris Research, Inc. v. Lydon, 505 F.Supp. 2d 1161, 1165 (D.Utah 2007).
25. Id. at 1165.
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quoted from the TDRA's new version of Section 43(c)(1) 26 and
43(c)(2)(A) (setting forth the TDRA's standard for fame),27 but then
applied the FTDA's old multifactor test for determining the fame of
the mark to find that the plaintiffs mark was not sufficiently famous
to qualify for federal antidilution protection.28 Based on the content of
the dilution analyses themselves, however, it is doubtful that these
hybrid approaches affected the outcomes of the courts' dilution
determinations in these two opinions.
The FTDA still continues to exert influence over the case law of
the TDRA era in another, less direct way. Subtracting from the
eighty-five opinions studied the twelve that considered only a statelevel antidilution cause of action, the twenty-one that explicitly
applied the FTDA, and the two that unknowingly applied in part the
FTDA, we are left with fifty opinions that either explicitly applied
only the TDRA or otherwise did not make explicit which federal act
they were applying. Of these fifty opinions, eleven applied circuit
doctrine explicitly based on the old FTDA, to the extent that it iterates
the language of the FTDA. 29 Again, it is doubtful that these courts'
application of circuit doctrine based on the FTDA affected the
outcomes of their dilution determinations.
In at least one additional opinion from the subset of fifty,
however, pre-TDRA circuit doctrine arguably did affect the outcome
30
of the court's federal dilution analysis. In Pet Silk, Inc. v. Jackson,
filed in March 2007, Pet Silk, Inc. sued an unauthorized distributor of
its Pet Silk brand pet grooming products. In finding dilution, the
District Court for the Southern District of Texas dutifully applied

26.

Vista India v. Raaga, 501 F.Supp. 2d 605, 622 (D.N.J. 2007).

27.

Id. at 623.

28.
Id. at 622 ("[T]he Third Circuit has articulated the following factors, culled from 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)" (citing Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 2001))).
29.
See, e.g., Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 547 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Kellogg Co.
v. Toucan Golf Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 802 (6th Cir. 2003), for the proposition that to succeed in a
federal antidilution claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant "cause[d] dilution of the
distinctive quality" of the plaintiffs mark); Diane Von Furstenberg Studio v. Snyder, No.
I:06CV1356(JCC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66633, at *9-10 (E.D. Va. Sept. 10, 2007) (citing
CareFirstof Maryland, Inc. v. First Care, 434 F.3d 263, 274 (4th Cir. 2006), for the proposition
that "[t]he Fourth Circuit has defined dilution as 'the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark
to identify and distinguish goods or services"'); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity
Dog, LLC, 464 F. Supp. 2d 495, 503-04 (E.D. Va., 2007) (same). See also Jarritos, Inc. v. Los
Jarritos, No. C 05-02380 JSW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32245, at *52 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2007)
(citing Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1999), for the proposition
that to state a claim for federal trademark dilution, a plaintiff must show that, inter alia, "the
defendant is making a commercial use of the mark in commerce").
30.

Pet Silk, Inc., v. Jackson, 481 F. Supp. 2d 824 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
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various provisions of the new TDRA, but the court also applied preTDRA Fifth Circuit doctrine. Specifically, with respect to the degree
of fame a mark must possess to qualify for antidilution protection, the
court noted that "the Fifth Circuit has held that market fame is
sufficient." 3' While the circuits were previously split over whether the
FTDA protected marks with merely "niche" or "market" fame,3 2 the
TDRA quite clearly denies protection to such marks. In fact, it does
so in statutory language that the Pet Silk court itself quoted: "[A]
mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming
public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or
services of the mark's owner., 33 "Pet Silk" is hardly the kind of
nationally-famous mark that the drafters of the TDRA had in mind
when they formulated the fame standards of the new Section
43(c)(2)(A), 34 and should not have received federal antidilution
35
protection.

III. THE REDUNDANCY

OF THE DILUTION CAUSE OF ACTION

What does current U.S. antidilution law actually do? What
difference does it make in practice? The answer appears to be not
much. Though the eighty-five opinions studied represent a subset of
federal antidilution and anti-infringement litigation, 36 they

31. Id. at 830 (citing Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, Co., 238
F.3d 378, 380 (5th Cir. 2001)).
32. See David J. Kera & Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Annual Review: A. United States, The
Fifty-Sixth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946-Part Ill, 94
TRADEMARK REP. 70, 133-38 (2004).

33. See PetSilk, 481 F. Supp 2d at 830 n.8 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)).
34. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, H.R. Rep. No. 109-23, at 8 ("[T]he
legislation expands the threshold of 'fame' and thereby denies protection for marks that are
famous only in 'niche' markets.").
35.
In fairness to the Pet Silk court, it did note that the plaintiff brought a Texas
antidilution cause of action in addition to its federal action, and that "[tihe Texas anti-dilution
statute explicitly requires only distinctiveness, not fame." Pet Silk, 481 F. Supp 2d at 830 n.7
(citing Advantage Rent-A-Car, 238 F.3d at 381 and TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 16.29).
However, the Pet Silk court nevertheless held that the Pet Silk mark qualified for federal
antidilution protection. Id. at 832. See also Tex. Tech Univ. v. Spiegelberg, 461 F. Supp. 2d 510,
523-24 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (finding dilution under the provisions of the TDRA while also finding
that the plaintiff Texas Technical University's scarlet and black color scheme was famous only
in the state of Texas, if not only "[i]n this university town" of Lubbock, Texas).
36. A significant limitation of this study's methodology is that it does not include
opinions or judgments not reported in Westlaw or Lexis. Nevertheless, Clarissa Long's work on
courts' application of the FTDA lends some support to the proposition that outcomes in reported
and unreported antidilution opinions are roughly similar. See Long, supra note 12, at 1050-51.
Another significant limitation of this study's methodology is that it does not account for the
impact of antidilution law on cease-and-desist practice. It may well be that the primary success
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nevertheless strongly suggest that courts' dilution determinations are
largely redundant of their infringement determinations, and that the
former fail to yield any remedies not already provided by the latter.
Take, for example, the Pet Silk case. There, the court had found
infringement and on that basis granted all of the remedies that the
plaintiff sought, so the outcome of the dilution determination was
academic at best. 37 This Part shows the extent to which the Pet Silk
situation is typical of our case law and seeks briefly to explain why
antidilution protection remains superfluous.
A.

The CorrelationBetween Infringement and Dilution
Outcomes

To what extent do the outcomes of courts' infringement analyses
correlate with the outcomes of their dilution analyses? Of the eightyfive opinions studied, sixty-four analyzed both a claim for trademark
infringement and a claim for trademark dilution.38 Table 4 reports that
fifty-seven (89%) of these sixty-four opinions reached the same
outcome under both analyses. One of these seven opinions, a
particularly eccentric outlier, 39 found infringement but no dilution.
The other six opinions found that outstanding issues of fact prevented
summary disposition of the infringement claim, but nevertheless
found no dilution. Each of these six opinions rejected the dilution
claim on the basis that the plaintiff had not shown that its mark was
sufficiently famous. 40 Importantly, however, of these sixty-four
of antidilution law to date is that it empowers potential plaintiffs with a greater ability to
threaten potential defendants, particularly those that are unsophisticated, with prohibitive
litigation costs.
37. See Pet Silk, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 834.
38. Of these 64 opinions, 24 applied only the TDRA, 19 applied only the FTDA, 3
applied both the TDRA and the FTDA, and 8 applied only a state antidilution statute. The
remaining 10 opinions applied federal antidilution law, but it was not clear whether the court
was applying the TDRA, FTDA, or both.
39. See Best W. Int'l v. Prime Tech Dev., L.L.C., No. 05-4049, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29285 (C.D. I11.Apr. 20, 2007). In considering the defendant's uncrossed motion for summary
judgment, the court, acting sua sponte, granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on its
trademark infringement claim. Id. at *27. However, the court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendant on the plaintiff's dilution claim. Id. at *28. In doing so, the court noted
that the defendant had ceased to use the mark before the effective date of the TDRA and that the
plaintiff did not contest the dilution claim in its motion papers responding to the defendant's
motion for summary judgment. Id. at *28.
40. See S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. Austl. Gold, Inc., No. 05-CV-1217(JS)(MLO), 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 74712, at *49 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2007); Phase Forward Inc. v. Adams, No. C 054232 JF (HRL), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56022, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2007); Hodgdon
Powder Co. v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1232-33 (D. Kan. 2007);
Hamzik v. Zale Corp., No. 3:06-CV-1300, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28981, at *15 (N.D.N.Y.
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opinions that analyzed both an infringement and a dilution cause of
action, none found dilution without also finding infringement.
Furthermore, of the fourteen opinions that found both infringement
and dilution, not one granted extra relief based on the dilution claim.
TABLE 4
CROSS-TABULATION OF INFRINGEMENT AND DILUTION OUTCOMES

Dilution Outcome
Dilution
Found

Dilution
Not Found

14

1

15

Infringement
Not Found

26

26

Fact Issue

6

Infringement
Found
Infringement
Outcome

Fact
Issue

14

Other
Total

14

33

Other

14

Total

20
3

3

3

1 64

What about opinions during the period studied in which a court
was presented with both an infringement and a dilution cause of
action, but on the basis of the outcome of its analysis of one of these
causes of action, declined to analyze the other? As an index of courts'
tendency to bypass or short-circuit a dilution issue when given the
chance, twenty-eight federal court opinions filed during the period
studied and reported in either the Westlaw or Lexis databases
referenced but avoided analyzing a dilution issue on the grounds that
their infringement determination made doing so unnecessarya '-one
opinion did so even when it found no infringement.4 2 (Because they
did not analyze a dilution issue, these twenty-eight opinions were not
included in this study's core data set of eighty-five opinions). By
comparison, only two opinions from the period studied found
Apr. 19, 2007); Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-5340 JF (RS),
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32450, at *39-40 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007); Fuel Clothing Co. v. Safari
Shirt Co., No. CV05-1220-HU, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92052, at *16 (D. Ore. Dec. 18, 2006).
41.
See, e.g., DD IP Holder LLC v. Stickney, No. 07-201 S, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
42732, at *9 (D. R.I. June 12, 2007) ("Because Dunkin has shown a likelihood of success on the
merits, and because, as explained above, the other factors collapse into that finding, Dunkin's
motion is GRANTED.")
42. See, e.g., Wild Willy's Holding Co. v. Palladino, 463 F. Supp. 2d 65, 72 (D. Me.
2006) ("[T]he Court finds that on this record there is little likelihood of confusion. Plaintiffs
failure of proof on this element of the test makes it unnecessary for the Court to consider the
other factors in the preliminary injunctive relief analysis.").
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dilution, and on that basis declined to analyze the infringement claim
before them.43 (These two opinions were included in this study's data
set). One of these opinions addressed a motion for default judgment in
which the plaintiff barely touched on the infringement side of its
case. 44 The other of these opinions was Nike v. Nikepal,45 from an
Eastern District of California case in which the well-known athletic
goods producer sued a distributor of laboratory equipment who
testified that he "selected the word 'Nike' by opening a dictionary to a
random page and choosing the first word he saw, and then combined
it the with first three letters of his first name 'Pal."' ' 46 The Nikepal
case is arguably the only reported opinion during the one-year period
studied in which the dilution cause of action appeared significantly to
drive the outcome of the case.47

43. See Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int'l, Inc., 84 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1820, 1822 n.2 (E.D. Cal. 2007);
Qwest Commc'ns. Int'l v. Sonny Corp., No. C06-0020P, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87007, at *1213 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2006) ("[lI]t does not appear that Qwest would gain any additional
relief under its remaining claims").
44. Qwest Commc'ns. Int'l., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87007, at *12-13.
45. Nike, 84 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1820.
46. Id. at 1823.
47. Id. I am grateful to Shari Seidman Diamond for bringing this case to my attention.
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FIGURE I
RATIO OF PROPORTION OF OPINION WORD COUNT CONSIDERING
INFRINGEMENT TO PROPORTION OF OPINION WORD COUNT CONSIDERING
DILUTION IN 64 FEDERAL COURT OPINIONS, OCTOBER 6, 2006 TO OCTOBER
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Finally, returning to the sixty-four opinions that analyzed both a
claim for trademark infringement and a claim for trademark dilution
during the period studied, word count analysis 48 of these opinions
yields an admittedly quite rough but nevertheless interesting measure
of the degree to which courts tend to privilege their analysis of an
infringement claim over their analysis of a dilution claim. 49 Figure 1
shows that while eleven of these sixty-four opinions (17%) devoted a
greater proportion of their opinion to the dilution claim than to the
infringement claim, fifty-one (80%) devoted a greater proportion of
their opinion to the infringement claim-in many, a greater
proportion by far. Two opinions were coded as devoting the same

48. 1 used the qualitative data analysis program Atlas.ti 5.2.0 to conduct this word count
analysis.
49. See Laura A. Heymann, Metabrandingand Intermediation:A Response to Professor
Fleischer, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 217 (2007) ("In modem trademark law, trademark
infringement is the workhorse.").
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s
number of words to the infringement claim as to the dilution claim. o
In these two opinions, the courts analyzed both claims
simultaneously, in one, because the defendant was found not to have
made a "commercial use" of the plaintiffs trademark, 5' and in the
other, because the infringement and dilution claims were found,
remarkably, to involve legal standards
that were "extremely similar or
52
another.,
one
upon
dependent

B. Why Antidilution ProtectionRemains Redundant
A variety of factors likely accounts for, if not over-determines,
the redundancy in courts' infringement and dilution determinations in
the opinions studied. First, as has been well recognized, 53 antiinfringement protection has expanded so dramatically in subject
matter, scope, and mode (e.g., initial-interest confusion, post-sale
confusion) over the past decades that it offers at least as extensive a
level of protection as does antidilution protection, particularly for the
kinds of famous marks that qualify for the latter. Second and
relatedly, though the TDRA has established a laxer, more inclusive
"likelihood of dilution" standard for the finding of dilution, the
TDRA provides for damages (in addition to injunctive relief) only for
"willfully" dilutive uses that began after the October 6, 2006 effective
date of the Act. 4 Thus, it may simply be too soon to expect to see
cases in which plaintiffs seek to take advantage of the new, laxer
standard of the TDRA to obtain damages that an infringement action
might not otherwise yield.55
There is also a third, more theoretical explanation for the
redundancy of infringement and dilution outcomes. The currently
dominant theoretical explanation for why we provide trademarks with

50. See Marco's Franchising, L.L.C. v. Marco's Italian Express, Inc., No. 8:06-cv-00670T-17-TGW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49211 (M.D. Fla. July 9, 2007); See also Crown Realty &
Dev., Inc. v. Sandblom, No. CV 06-1442-PHX-JAT, 2007 WL 177842 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2007).
51.
Crown Realty, 2007 WL 177842, at *1-2. On the issue of trademark "use," see
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark
Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597 (2007); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademark and
Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777 (2004); Eric Goldman,
DeregulatingRelevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 554-59 (2005).
52. Marco's Franchising,2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49211, at *10.
53. See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1913-14 (2007).

54. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(5)(B)(i)-(ii) (West Supp. 2007).
55. 1 am grateful to Mark Lemley for proposing, though not necessarily endorsing, this
explanation.
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antidilution protection is that doing so lessens consumers' "search
costs."' 56 As Judge Posner has explained,
A trademark seeks to economize on information costs by providing
a compact, memorable and unambiguous identifier of a product or
service. The economy is less when, because the trademark has
other associations, a person seeing it must think for a 57moment
before recognizing it as the mark of the product or service.
Understood in terms of search costs, antidilution protection is
essentially an inverted form of anti-infringement protection.5 8 There
are several fundamental problems with this theory of antidilution
law, 59 not the least of which is how it accounts for dilution by
"tarnishment" or why it should be provided only to famous marks.
Setting these aside for the purposes of this article, we can at least
understand why, when presented with a search costs rationale both for
anti-infringement protection and for antidilution protection, judges
should so often conflate the two forms of trademark protection.
Indeed, in the Second Circuit, some judges continue to assume that
evidence of consumer confusion also serves as evidence of trademark
dilution -notwithstanding
the fundamental axiom in trademark
doctrine that an individual consumer may either be confused as to
source or be experiencing dilution, but never both.6'

56. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn
from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1197 (2006) ("[L]ike traditional trademark law,
dilution properly understood is targeted at reducing consumer search costs.").
57.
Richard Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 75 (1992). See
also Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (discussing the search
costs rationale).
58.
See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621,
691 (2004).
59.

Id.

60.
See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 219 (2d Cir. 1999)
("Consumer confusion would undoubtedly dilute the distinctive selling power of a trademark.").
See also Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests,
77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 1004 (1999) (noting that "[c]ourts engaged in dilution analysis can be seen
using the tools of consumer confusion. And vice versa.").
61.

See MCCARTHY, supra note I, at § 24:72. McCarthy explains:
A given unauthorized use by defendant can cause confusion in some people's
minds and in other people's minds cause dilution by blurring, but in no one
person's mind can both perceptions occur at the same time. Either a person thinks
that the similarly branded goods or services come from a common source (or are
connected or affiliated) or not. In that sense they are inconsistent states of
customer perception. But viewing the relevant customer group en masse, while
some customers may be confused as to source or connection, other customers
recognize the independence of source. For the former group, the legal claim is the
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IV. JUDICIAL NEGLECT OF THE TDRA's REFORMS
A.

The TDRA's Modes of Dilution

As many have recognized,6 2 trademark dilution is a notoriously
obscure concept, which may go far towards explaining why the search
costs rationale-easy to understand and to apply, especially when one
has just done so on the infringement side of the case-has taken hold.
Among the several innovations contained in the TDRA, one of the
most significant is its definition of two specific modes of dilution:
dilution by "blurring," which it defines as "association arising from
the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that
impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark,, 63 and dilution by
"tarnishment," which it defines as "association arising from the
similarity between a mark or trade name64 and a famous mark that
harms the reputation of the famous mark.,
Regrettably, however, at least in this first year of TDRA-era case
law, courts continue to fail regularly to specify what mode of dilution
(blurring or tarnishment) they are analyzing or have found. For
example, of the thirteen opinions that applied the FTDA (or whose
application of which statute was unclear) and who found dilution, five
failed to specify what mode of dilution they found 65 while two others
quoted from the now obsolete language of the FTDA to the effect that
the defendant's conduct "diminishes the ability of the [plaintiffs]
mark to identify and distinguish the [plaintiffs] goods. 6 6 Three
explicitly found tarnishment 67 and the remaining three explicitly
traditional one of a likelihood of confusion. For the latter group, the legal claim is
one of dilution.
62. See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee, Demystifying Dilution, 84 B.U. L. REV. 859, 860 (2004).
63.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2007).
64. Id.at. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
65. See Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 547 (6th Cir. 2006); Days Inns Worldwide,
Inc. v. Lincoln Park Hotels, Inc., 500 Fed. Supp. 2d 770, 775 (N.D. IlI. 2007); Levi Strauss &
Co. v. Fox Hollow Apparel Group, LLC, No. C-06-3765 SC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31355, at
*7-9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2007); Qwest Commc'ns. Int'l v. Sonny Corp., No. C06-0020P, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87007, at *3-7 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2006); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Yazan's Serv. Plaza, Inc., No. 05-70804, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75941, at *31 (E.D. Mich. Oct.
19, 2006).
66. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Van Dyke Liquor Mkt., Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 822, 832
(E.D. Mich. 2007); Eldorado Stone, LLC v. Renaissance Stone, Inc., No. 04cv2562 JM(CAB),
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60885, at *14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2007).
67. See Diane Von Furstenberg Studio v. Snyder, 1:06cv1356 (JCC), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 66633, at *9-11 (E.D. Va. Sept. 10, 2007); PepsiCo, Inc. v. # I Wholesale, LLC, No. 07CV-367, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53768, at *11-13 (N.D. Ga. July 20, 2007); Harris Research,
Inc. v. Lydon, 505 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1166 (D. Utah 2007).
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found blurring. 68 Overall, 53% of the eighty-five opinions studied
failed to reference either blurring or tamishment, and 49% of the fifty
opinions that applied the FTDA (or whose application of which
statute was unclear) failed to do so.
B. The TDRA 's"Recognition" Standard
Finally, on a qualitative note, it is remarkable that among the
trademarks found to be "widely recognized by the general consuming
public of the United States" in the opinions studied were the
following: DVF,6 9 Pet Silk,7 ° Rustic Ledge, 7' Cliffstone,72
Pycnogenol, 73 and the color combination consisting of scarlet and
black.74 To be sure, in the opinions studied, courts also found marks
such as Pepsi 75 and Nike 76 to be "widely recognized." However, the
former set of marks suggests that the TDRA's newly heightened
standard for fame has failed to limit the subject matter of federal
antidilution protection only to truly deserving marks.
V. CONCLUSION
It is an oft-told parable that when, in 1972, Henry Kissinger
asked the Chinese Premier Zhou En Lai for his assessment of the
historical significance of the French Revolution of 1789, the latter
replied: "It's too soon to tell. '77 The same may certainly be said of the

68.
Pet Silk, Inc. v. Jackson, 481 F. Supp. 2d 824, 831-32 (S.D. Tex. 2007); Tex. Tech
Univ. v. Spiegelberg, 461 F. Supp. 2d 510, 524 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int'l,
Inc., No. 84 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1820, 1828 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (noting that plaintiff "will face an

escalating erosion of its famous mark and NIKE will lose its ability to serve as a sourceidentifying mark.").
69. See Diane Von Furstenberg Studio v. Snyder, 1:06cv1356 (JCC), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 66633 (E.D. Va. Sept. 10, 2007).
70.

See Pet Silk, Inc. v. Jackson, 481 F. Supp. 2d 824 (S.D. Tex. 2007).

71.

See Eldorado Stone, LLC v. Renaissance Stone, Inc., No. 04cv2562 JM(CAB), 2007

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60885 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2007).
72.

See id.

73. See Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2006).
74. See Tex. Tech Univ. v. Spiegelberg, 461 F. Supp. 2d 510 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
75. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. # I Wholesale, LLC, No. 07-CV-367, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
53768 (N.D. Ga. July 20, 2007).
76. See Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int'l, Inc., 84 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1820 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
77. See BRIAN HOOK, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE IN CHINA 42 (1996). There are
many variations on this parable, including some in which Chairman Mao is replying to a
question from President Nixon (or Kissinger) or Zhou En Lai is responding to a question from
Andr6 Malraux or Nixon. See, e.g., ELIZABETH J. PERRY, PATROLLING THE REVOLUTION:
WORKER MILITIAS, CITIZENSHIP, AND THE MODERN CHINESE STATE (2006) (Zhou En Lai
responding to Malraux).
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significance of the TDRA. Even so, the first year of TDRA case law
is far from encouraging. It clearly has not been enough simply to pass
a new law. In current practice, if not also in current theory, the
dilution cause of action continues to be redundant of the infringement
cause of action. Even courts that showed an awareness of the new Act
often failed to implement its reforms. In the few reported opinions
that addressed a speech-related issue, the TDRA's new, more robust
"[e]xclusions '' 78 from antidilution protection played no appreciable
role. 79 The dead hand of the FTDA still plagues the law.
What, then, is to be done? As a general matter, the trademark bar
must work to insure that the federal courts recognize that the TDRA
and its various reforms are now the law of the land. The momentum
that led to the promulgation of the TDRA must be maintained, now in
the courts, lest the Act end up a dead letter. More specifically and
admittedly somewhat idiosyncratically, I propose here, as I have
elsewhere, 80 an additional course of action: we should abandon
altogether the term "dilution." This term has caused us nothing but
trouble. Instead, we should speak more specifically of "trademark
blurring" and "trademark tarnishment" and of anti-blurring and antitarnishment protection-two forms of protection that have, in fact,
very little to do with each other, 81 and arguably little to do with
82
antidilution protection as originally conceived by Frank Schechter.
The TDRA represents an important halfway point in the hoped-for
demise of the term "dilution." Though the Act continues to use the
term, it relies much more heavily on the somewhat more precise
concepts of "blurring" and "tarnishment." The trademark bar should
follow the lead of the Act and urge courts to do the same.

78. 15 U.S.C.A. § 125(c)(3) (West Supp. 2007).
79. See, e.g., Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 973-74
(C.D. Cal. 2007) (applying FTDA); Harris Research, Inc. v. Lydon, 505 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 116566 (D. Utah 2007); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 464 F. Supp. 2d
495, 503-05 (E.D. Va. 2006).
80. See Beebe, supra note 1,at 1174.
81.
See Beebe, supra note 58, at 695-98.
82. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.
REV. 813, 822, 830 (1927) (observing that "the creation and retention of custom, rather the
designation of source, is the primary purpose of the trademark today" and arguing that
trademark law should seek to preserve the "arresting uniqueness and hence [the] selling power"
of qualifying trademarks).
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